Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 1 | Number 1

Article 5

1-1-1994

From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Abundance
A. Dan Tarlock

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
A. Dan Tarlock, From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Abundance, 1 Hastings West Northwest J. of Envtl. L. & Pol'y 71 (1994)
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol1/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

I. Introduction: The Urban-Ag-Power Coalition Collapses
California water politics and law are in a tumultuous transition

From Natural Scarcity
to Artificial Abundance
The Legacy of California
Water Law and Politics
by A. Da".Tarlock*

from an era of artificial abundance to one of fixed and limited
supplies because of the intense competition among potentially
inconsistent demands. Perhaps more than any other place in
the world. California has been able to prosper by joining the
advances in water use technology with those in agriculture to
compensate for limited and variable supplies in the areas
attractive to settlement. Large carry-over storage reservoirs.
aqueducts and high capacty pumps' were used to exploit its
abundant surface and groundwater resources and to turn the
arid southern third of the state into one of the most productive
agricultural areas in the world as well as an oasis megalopolis.
After the mining, grazing and dry farming grain economies collapsed at the end of the 1880s. California built its great economy on irrigated agriculture and perpetual urbanization. 2 Until
the 1930s. three major uses. irrigated agriculture, hydroelectric
power generation and municipal and industrial use, competed
for the state's available resources. Other uses such as recreation and fish and wildlife protection were recognized, but they
were historically secondary to the big three uses.3 Through
aggressive state capitalism 4 and a byzantine but supportive
legal regime, all major users were served and by the end of the
1930s conflict among these uses gave way to cooperation.5
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This "iron triangle"6 of water users satisfied their
demands, with ultra-conservative margins of safety, by
an aggressive policy of supply augmentation rather
than drought risk allocation and demand management. The state was veined with reservoirs and aqueducts to move water from the water-rich north to the
semi-arid and arid south and to transport the state's
share of the Colorado River, along with a good portion
of Arizona's, 7 across the Mojave desert. State credit
and the federal treasury were used to pay for the engineering, and political clout was used to avoid serious
controls on water use among the major users. The
"iron triangle" began to rust out in the 1960s because
it failed to deal with the delayed cost of supply
augmentation-environmental degradation-and the
erosion of public support for regional development
subsidies. 8 Rising project costs, reduced stream flows 9
and saline and toxic leachate became major water
issues in the 1970s and the 1980s.10 The closing of
Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge and Reservoir after
its soils became contaminated with selenium is symbolic of the social costs of irrigation westwide. i"
Ongoing efforts to accommodate these uses by fashioning a "sustainable" water use policy have fundamentally changed the politics of water allocation in
California. For over two decades, California water politics have been driven by the increased public taste for
environmental protection, by the continued urbanization of the state in the face of an 85% agriculture/I 5%

urban allocation and by the growing realization that
future available supplies will remain relatively fixed,
As cartel theory teaches, it is harder to maintain a
cartel in bad times as opposed to good times.
Cooperation gives way to self-interest. After the major
water suppliers, such as the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California, realized that there
would be no technological fix to meet future urban and
industrial demands, urban water users have cautiously joined forces with environmental groups to put the
squeeze on agriculture.12 Many in the California "water
community" have tried to forge a new consensus, to
replace the one which existed through the 1950s, by
expanding the circle of represented interests to serve
all demands through "a spirit of mutual accommodation." In September of 1991, the environmental community and major water suppliers signed a memorandum of understanding and agreed to bypass efforts for
a three-way solution, instead concentrating on technology-forcing strategies. 13 Encouraged, In 1992,
Governor Wilson gave a speech entitled "Ending
California Water Wars" which captures the current
aspirations but not the reality of California water politics, which is leaderless, and is thus a series of ad hoc
symbolic steps. A sustainable water policy for the state
is necessary, but it will be difficult to achieve, The politics of artificial abundance provide few positive
lessons for the politics of re-allocation. 14
The state's water budget and the projected

THE GREATTHIRST.CALIFORNIANS
ANDWATER1770s-1990s (1992).

II. The "Kesterson problem" Is actually a delayed response to an
early warning sign that the"reclamation era" was over. The San Luis Unit
of the Central Valley Project, on the upper west side of the San Joaquin
Valley, was the last major unit to be constructed The west side of the
valley is much more saline compared to the east side, and originally the
project included the San Luls Drain which would dump saline return
flows Into the San Francisco Bay estuary. Water quality and financial
concerns led to the state's decision not to participate In the drain In
1967, and the Bureau of Reclamation constructed only the first phase of
the drain which flowed Into Kesterson reservoir. This reservoir was orlginally Intended as a temporary holding area but became a permanent
toxic repository by default. See Com.mrree ON IRRIGATION-INDUCED
WATER
QUALrTY
PROBLEMS,
NATIONAL
RESEARCH
COUNCIL,
IRRIGATION-INDUCED
WATER
QUALIUYPROBL_%s:
WHAT CANBE LEARNED
FROM
THE SAN JOAQUINVALLEY
EXPERIENCE
(1989).

6 -iron triangle" refers to the power of cohesive interests to control a political agenda and frustrate the inclusion of other agendas.
During most of this century, water resources were dominated by three
powerful forces: Western congressmen, the Bureau of Reclamation and
state water administrators. The decline of this coalition or triangle is
chronicled in DAVID LEwis FELDMAN,WATERRESOURCES
MANAGEMENT.
IN
SEARCH OFAN ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHIC
(1991).
7. See infra note 17.
8 Many of the early environmental battles were efforts to stop
large reservoirs and grandiose inter-regional water transfers. The
Bureau's futile efforts to finance the Central Arizona Project with dams
at either end of the Grand Canyon marked the beginning of the end
because the political momentum balance shifted to efficiency and envi-

ronmental protection. See

MARC REISNER.CADILLACDESERT(1986) and
MARCREISNER
& SARAHBATES,
OVERTAPPED
OASIS: REFORM.ORREVOLUnON
FOR

WATER 15-48 (1990) for the history of the decline and fall of the
Bureau of Reclamation.
WESTERN

9. The abandonment of the Dos Rios project, which would have
diverted water from the Eel basin to the Sacramento, led to the state
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and to the Inclusion of many north coast
rivers in the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. See Harrison Dunning,
Dam Fights and Wafer Policy in California: 1969-89, I.W., July 1990. at 14;
Sally K. Fairfax et al., Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You
See It. Now You Don't, 59 WASH.L Rev. 417 (1984).
10. The basic problem is that irrigation mobilizes minerals in the
soil. To sustain irrigation, the drainage water must go somewhere. For
example, the sink for the Imperial Valley is the Salton Sea. This problem
goes back to the dawn of the early irrigation societies in the Middle East
and China. However, It is only in recent years that we have begun to pay
attention to the ultimate fate of irrigation drainage and to begin to contemplate the cost of environmentally sustainable irrigation. For a review
of the literature, see AGRICULTURAL SAUNry ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
(Kenneth K. Tanl ed.), especially Ian van Schilfgaarde, Irrigated
Agriculture: Is It Sustainable? 584 (1993).

12. The 1989 "Conservation" Agreement between the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California and the Imperial Irrigation District
agreed, without regard to the parties rights under the Law of the River,
that MWD would pay liD $220 million over a 30 year period to conserve
100,000 acre feet per year, which MWD will take through Its upstream
Colorado River diversion, See COMMIrEE ONWESTERN WATER
MANAGEMENT,
NATIONAL RESEARCHCOUNCIL,WATERTRANSFERS
IN THE WEST. EmcIENcy,

EcUrTY
ANDTHEENVIRONMENT
213-47 (1992) I hereinafter WATER
TRANSFERS
INTHEWSTI.
13. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Urban Water
Conservation in California (September 1991) (on file with WestNortfhwesl). The key provision Is the adoption of a definition of "Best
Management Practices" which Includes both generally accepted conservation practices and new practices 'for which sufficient data are available from existing water conservation projects to Indicate that signiflcant" and technically and economically reasonable conservation benefits can be achieved consistent with environmental protection and social
equity.
14 At the end of his history of California's water policies, Norris
Hundley surveys the recent efforts to change direction and assesses
them as "largely piecemeal, often undermined by lack ef enforcement, and
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changes in water demand explain why current controversies swirl around the idea of limits for the first time
in the Golden State's history. California has an average 93 MAF [million acre-feetl per year (within a range
of 77 to 123 MAF) of natural and imported surface flow
plus groundwater withdrawals. About 70 percent of the
surface runoff is in the Sacramento and North Coast
basins, and the remaining 30 percent is in southern
California. The demand picture is the reverse: 70 percent of the demand is in the south and 30 percent in
the wetter north. With the aid of the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. California
has been able to practice the politics of redistribution
to overcome geographical and seasonable supply
imbalances and user group interest conflicts. It made
the semi-arid San loaquin Valley and semi-desert
southern California into irrigated gardens after small
irrigation colonies and urban demands, which resulted
from the first wave of immigration from the Middle
\Vest, claimed available natural supplies."5
The state has solved its chronic supply imbalance
by capturing about 34.2 MAF per year and dedicating
27.7 MAF to agricultural and 5.6 MAF to urban uses.
6
Wildlife, recreation and hydropower receive 0.9 MAF.1
By 2010, total water demand is expected to increase
4.2 percent to 35.6 MAF, with agricultural remaining
constant and the other two categories increasing. This
projection assumes that the current 2 MAF of groundwater overdraft will hold, and that the projected loss of
0.8 MAF of Colorado River water allocated to Arizona
by the 1963 Supreme Court decree 7 will be offset by
the same amount of unallocated Central Valley Project
Water (coincidentally the same amount that Congress
reallocated to fish and wildlife maintenance in 1992).

As two leading students of California water policy have
observed. 'lilt is not clear how California will meet the
projected growth in water demand while preserving
current patterns of water use."Is
Global climate change scenarios, although too
uncertain to base a policy around, add to pressures
facing California Water suppliers. The stresses accom-

frequently more symbolic than real. especially when the appointees to
regulatory agencies lack the commitment or resources to carry out their
duties effectively.- HUNDLEY.
supra note 5. at 414 (emphasis addedl The
current draft of the California Water Plan Update begins with the statement. for the first time In recent history. Californians are finding that
existing water management systems are no longer able to provide sufficiently reliable water service to users." surveys the problems and reasons for institutional gridlock but suggests only that the state pursue an
unspecified mix of demand management and supply augmentation to
meet new demands. CAuFORNIA
DEP T OFWATER
REsouRcEs. DRAFT
BLU.LEM
No. i. CALFORNIA
WATER
PLAN
UPDATE
160-93 (1993

water users and the CAP entitlement may yet remain callfornia's to use
The basic reason that CAP water Is too expenshve for manyArizona users
is that the federal subsidy Is only about 5T; of the cost of delvering
water to Phoenix and Tucson See Michael I Brophy. The Effect of the
Central Arizona Ptolect on the Allocation of Colorado River Water
Supplies. Paper presented at Twelith Annual Water Law Conference of
the American Bar Association. Section on Natural Resources. Energy.
and Environmental Law. February 10-1l. 1994

15. See KEviN STARR,
INVENT
G THEDREm- CALUFoRNLA
THROUGH
THE
PRocREssvE ERA140-47 ( 1985l. for an account of the history of the citrus
culture in Southern California.

Cuv.ATE 213 (19931

16. These figures are taken from HI. Vaux. Ir, & Rex I Woods.
California's Water Resource: The Current Status and Future Changes. in
AGRIcuLTURE
IN CA0FORNIA:ON THE BRINKOF A NEw MILLENNIuM
69. 72
(1992).
17. Arizona v. California. 373 U S 546(1963). detrxea enteret 376 U S
340 (1964). The story of the epic struggle, analogous to the Trolan Wars.
has been told. See NoRRIs HUNDLEY.
JL-.WATER
ANDTHE
WEsT THE COL.,ADO
ROv.R
comPAcr ANDTHEPOLmCS OF WATER
INTHEA..ERCAN West 11975.
PHLuip L FRADxKN,
A RrvFRNo MoRE: THE COLORADO IVE AN THEWEsT
11981); Charles 1. Meyers, The Colorado Rivr. 19 STANL REv. I (19663.
David H. Getches. Competing Demands for the Coordo Rhr. 56 U Coto L
REv. 413 (1985); NEw CouRsEs FOR THECOLORADO
RTR MoR IssuEs Foo
THENrxr CENTURY
(Gary D. Weatherford and F Lee Brown eds. 19863 In
one of the great twists of fate, the Central Arizona Prolect. the comerstone of Arizona politics for the entire century. may bankrupt the state's

panying efforts to promote a sustainable water use
policy are potentially aggravated by the possibility that
greenhouse gas-induced global climate change will
have substantial adverse impacts in California.
California. with its naturally variable five month wet
season, is particularly vulnerable to an increase in
average temperatures. Projections suggest that the
Sierra Nevada snowpack will increase, but the spring

runoff will be earlier and thus the crucial April-July
runoff to support carry-over storage and federal and
state project delivery obligations could decrease by 30
percent.' 9 The net result could be a 7 to 15 percent cut
In State Water Project deliveries. In addition, estuarine
areas may be flooded from sea level rises20 and interior wetlands may be shrunk in size.
This essay puts California's on-going "water warsin their historic and legal context and in the larger
westwide context of the transition from the
"Reclamation Era" to the era of reallocation. 2 ' My thesis is that the era of supply augmentation produced a
set of political expectations and a legal regime to support them that makes it difficult for the state to move
toward a sustainable water use policy. Sustainability
carries with it two ideas that are alien to the ethic of
California water use. which has been premised on perpetual abundance) 2 The first is that environmental
protection is a use of equal dignity to historic con-

18 Ste Vaux &Woods.s upranote 16

19 Orre orFTEcH:;oLoca Asssw5.r I PavzzG Ft AnrUNCERTAI
20 Much of the California coast Is undergoing uplift, so the risks
are considerably less than those faced by the l w-lying Gulf coast and
Atlantic states, but erosion will still occur and substantial adverse
impacts could occur if a proected 12 meter rise In the San Francisco
Bay takes place See L'o,.E T EccvrTzTH RTka
Fr
T_ oGLA
Z
AI.W
..
I
A.
OFLO
SsA LzvEIs 59-51 (19911
21 Sez WATTE-

.rEsiTH:WEsrT. supra note 1Z

22 The relationship between abundant natural resources and the
American character was first brilliantly articulated by the late D..,'
POTERs
In his book PE;tE c7 P.Le-e (1957 and has been recast as the
central explanation on the difficulties that we. and the rest of the world.
face In replacing the culture of unlimited resource exploitation with one
premised on respect for the environment See. e-. Donald Worster Thz
eatcINature, inT IEWH,=
%_
We.m
or INaTte. 1,,'r'oTALHsrOcYA-iD THE
Ecor~oco. I" LoArnu~ 203 (IM)3 (hereinafter TH= WEALTHOF fLtUSSI.
Cu',E Pc,'rrozo. A GzEL- Hz~rav C,-THET
Woata THTEFr.=O-imsN-r mmITHE

COU±..sse r GrA rCr.-atAmbo:.s (191
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sumptive uses, and the second, which follows from the
first, is the need to deal with supply limits in the face
of continued population growth through drought riskallocation and demand management. California water
law makes the adjustment difficult. Existing water
rights are so uncertain because supply-augmentation
reduced the need to exercise them; therefore, all users
are at risk from proposed reallocations. It is thus more
difficult for water right holders to assess accurately the
effects of a proposed reallocation, especially for special districts which are already fearful that reallocation
23
will erode their political power.
Part II of this essay sets out the historic ethic that
drives water allocation in California and the West. Part
II explains how the ethic has created a set of allocation institutions that responded to an expanding,
technologically innovative economy. Part IVexamines
the legacy of this ethic for an era of fiscal limits and an
expanded compass of legitimate interests. The modern debate about water is a debate about alternative
visions of the future of the State and the distribution
of the resulting costs. However, it is difficult to address
these issues within the framework of existing institutions. The Reclamation Era created strong expectations that existing uses are both politically and legally
vested because they represent the natural order of
California. These expectations are powerful but the
drag of history is weaker than many in the water community assume as the state slouches toward a new era
of reallocation.
il. The Ethic of Water as
an Unlimited Engine of Progress
Historians define California in terms of its dams and
aqueducts, and the culture which they produced. Kevin
Starr begins his history of southern California's rise to
power with the following paragraph:

modern southern California had first to be
envisioned before they could be planned, The
envisioning of the projects was in and of Itself
a bold imaginative act.... Prophesying the
bringing of water to the desert and to cities
on the plain, they saw themselves embarked
on a work of social redemption Biblical In
24
metaphor and suggestion
This rearrangement of nature has been accomplished by a political consensus, forged during the first
half of this century, which created a unique set of water
allocation institutions. California's water institutions
have been intensively studied 25 and criticized as ineffi26
cient and as a regressive redistribution of wealth lovingly diagrammed by lawyers. However, for most of
this century, North-South and rural-urban interests
supported the allocation produced by unique privatepublic institutions that differ substantially In form and
substance from the rest of the West. The political consensus, forged out of the settlement of the Imperial
Valley and the construction of the Los Angeles
Aqueduct from the Owens Valley, 27 was that public
water should support large-scale private development,
The consensus rejected the more social democratic
cooperative visions of John Wesley Powell and William
Smythe, although all visions of irrigation were underpinned by a religious vision.28 The California and
Western vision was more an Old Testament vision of
redemption through triumph over a hostile oppressor:
in this case the desert. The coalition formed by this
consensus was fragile at times, such as the 1960 vote
on the State Water Project bonds, but It survived
through the planning, financing and construction of
the California state water project and lingered Into the
1970s before it recognized that it was terminally i11.29

The water engineering projects that created

its death was slow, but the 1992 congressional reallocation of the Central Valley Project memorializes Its
30
passing.
The consensus also had a pagan strain In
California. The state's water policy is a reflection of the

23. In California, special districts hold title to large blocks of water.

POWER: THE CONFLIcT OVER Los ANGELES'WATERSUPPLYINTHE O.,ENS VALLEY

Professor Barton H. Thompson. Jr. identified the interrelated technical
and Institutional barriers to water transfers in Institutional Perspectives on
Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL L REV.671 (1993). These include the
uncertain relationship between district and member-beneficiary water
rights titles, the lack of both district and member financial incentives
and the balance between the district's Interest In self-preservation and
the statewide interest In increased reallocation.

24. KEVIN
STARR,
MATERIAL
DREAMS:
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THROUGH THE
1920s 4 (1990).
25. For a recent comprehensive survey, see William R. Attwater &
James Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality Law. 19
PA. L 1. 957 (1988).
26. The leading exponent of this viewpoint, with a special emphasis on the Imperial and San Joaquin valleys, is DONALD
WORSTER.
RIVERS
OF
EMPIRE.
WATER, ARIDITY.
ANDTHE GRovrrH OFTHE AMEPJCAN/
WEST (1985).
27 This ongoing tale has been the subject of two excellent histories. ABRAHA.M
HOF-,%iAN.
VISION
OR VILLANY:
ORIGINS
OF THE OWENS
VALLEYLos ANGELES
WATER CONTROVERSY
(1981), and WILL 'i, L KAHRL,
WATER AND

(1982).
28. Donald Worster argues that "Irrigation myth Is an affirmation

of technology as a divinely ordained Instrument of domination over the
natural world. He traces the myth to Mesopotamia, Egypt and China
but argues its immediate genesis Is In Mormon collectivism In pre-statehood Utah. THE WEALTH OF NATURE,
supra note 22, at 112
29. The "constitution" of the coalition of the 1957 state water plan
was formed between the 1920s and 1950s CALIFORNL,
DEP'T
or WATER
RESOURCES. CALIFORNIA
WATER PLAN,BULLETINNo 3 (1957)

The plan was

Implemented by the bond Issue to finance the Oroville dam and aqueduct. The history of the plan through the narrow elections to authorize
the debt In 1960 and raise It in 1970 (through the debate over the peripheral canal) is set out in CHARLES 1. MEYERS & A. DANTARLOCK,
WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
335-56 (2d ed. 1980)
30. The Reclamation Projects Authorization Act of 1992. Pub L
102-575. authorizes the transfer of CVP water to users outside of the project area and dedicates the unallocated block of 800.000 acre feet to fish
and wildlife restoration.
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vision of California as a neo-Mediterranean Garden of
Eden endowed by nature with unlimited potential for
human growth and pleasure. To implement the vision.
nature had to be modified and social equity subordinated to large-scale agriculture and urban growth.3' In
reality, the state was and is a hostile environment for
agriculture, especially after the rise of world markets in
the 19th century. and it took intense manipulation by
University agricultural scientists to sustain the garden. 32 This vision supported the ethic that water

should not be a constraint on agriculture and the
urbanization of southern California. As Kevin Starr has
observed, the post-Civil War visionaries who shaped
20th century California believed that "lal region
33
"
was.. .what its water system enabled it to be.

During most of this century. California managed
to turn a scarce or maldistributed resource into a free.
or at least cheap, good by developing a system of
municipal, federal and state reservoirs and canals 34 to
move the water from the area of origin to the area of
demand at subsidized prices. The allocation institutions reflected the ethic of perpetual abundance and
provided strong incentives both to use surface waters
and aquifers as unrestricted commons and as sinks.
This was done by imposing few effective and enforceable limits on water use--especially by large municipal and agricultural users. This ethic still prevails in
much of the Vest; it drives water politics in Arizona
and Nevada, but it is slowly dying out in California. It
has taken the water community in the San Joaquin
Valley and elsewhere over two decades to realize that
the Reclamation era in fact ended in the early 1970s
and that neither "free spending- Democrats nor "cowboy- Republicans have the political will or power to
3
revive it. 5

IllI. Water Law as a Response to the Water Ethic
California's complex dual system of appropriative and
riparian rights has allowed the creation of a system
that was never designed to limit individual users to
conserve a scarce resource. Carry-over storage effectively minimized the risks of drought and allowed the
31. The tension between social equity and water development has
been persistent in California. Some see It as example of Karl Mittfogel's
thesis that centralized state control of water distribution Is Inevitably
despotic See KAR.
W/rrrooi. OaRInTA. DEspoas: A CmPAATn-E S'ro N
TorAL Paows (1957]. The leading modem student of this thesis Is
wORsER. supra note 26. There is no question that California has subordinated social equity, especially In San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys, to
water development See HUNDLEY.
supra note 5, at 257-98 However, the
California experience is too complex to be captured by the despotism
thesis, especially since the leffersonlan dream of small farmers was
never right for the West, and the irrigation empire Is now In retreat westwide. For two criticisms of Worster seeHUNDLEY.
L at xvi, and A Dan
Tarlock, DamningThe Dams and Ditches. A RevLip of D. Wonte Ri.rncflEmirr
water,Aridity And T"heAmerican West, 27 NAT.REsouRcEs I 477 (1987_
32. GEORGE
S. WELLs. GARDEN
IN THEWEST:
A DRAmATtC
AccouNT cF
SCIENCE
INAGRICULTURE
(1969) is the University of California's official version of its efforts to sustain agriculture In the state

From l~tutd
11ftd SaIII& to Azt~dalAhn!Ice
S~rciIy to AiIi~dal Abmdance
frcm
state simultaneously to pursue unlimited agricultural
and urban growth 3 Abundance shaped California
water law by creating enough water to dispense with
the need to use water rights for allocation.
California's water law is characterized by three
distinctive features that explain the current controversies over the future direction of California water and
the difficulty of adjusting existing allocation regimes
to new demands. First. water rights do not function to
allocate water, but as licenses to take until the taking
is contested. Water rights have historically functioned
to provide the necessary entitlements to share in the
bounty of the state's natural or augmented supply.
Second. the state has never asserted effective management over the state's water users as opposed to storage and distribution. Third, there has historically been
no effective federal counter to state water allocation.
The reverse seems to be the case now because the first
two characteristics have made it impossible for the
state to assume the role of manager, rather than
lender and carrier.
In a famous address to the American Bar
Association in 1922. California Supreme Court Chief
lustice Lucien Shaw characterized California water law
as the progressive adjustment to the successive
economies of the state: mining, irrigation and urbanIzation.3 7 There is much truth to this argument-much
more than revisionist historians s and law professors
recognize. However. the celebratory tradition of
California water law and policy needs to be reevaluated. California's water institutions need to be fundamentally reexamined because the state has relied on a
political rather than property rights regime to allocate
water.
A. The California Systems: Licenses Not Rights
California water rights do not resemble water
rights elsewhere in the West. Unlike almost everything
else in California. the state's water institutions have
not been copied by the rest of the United States.
although they have been much studied. The ultimate
irony came a few years ago when Congressman Miller
turned to the anti-California Arizona model as the
model of groundwater conservation to impose on the
33 STRR. suapr nzte 24. at 8
34 The best description of the sistem Is Wam.-:.
CAIIIcSNI WATER
An..s (1979)
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Valley. California appropriative and riparian water
rights are more like unquantified licenses to receive
large blocks of stored water or to capture natural flows
or groundwater. California water law has moved from
the communal Spanish and early colonial irrigation
customs to the rugged individualism of the post-Civil
War era to the present form of privately controlled
state capitalism. Strong local institutions control large
blocks of water with substantial margins of safety so
that there is seldom a need to stand on water rights as
there is in Colorado, for example. Water rights in
California, common law or administrative, are licenses
to take as much as the user can take unless someone,
in rare instances, challenges the right. This situation
describes San Joaquin groundwater use, Delta water
rights and California's historic use of the Colorado
river. In short, water rights do not function to distribute
risks among users or to define transferable quantities.
B. Money Not Control
There are no effective allocation controls at the
state level because the major users have strenuously
resisted them. Since William Hammond Hall, the first
State Engineer, there has never been a state water
"administrator" powerful and/or colorful enough to
warrant the fictional treatment that John Nichols did
with New Mexico's legendary Stephen Reynolds in The
Milagro Beanfield War. Hall's California legacy is one of
vision not management. "Californians have never been
reluctant to ask the courts to resolve disputes, but
have also customarily resisted legislative attempts to
tell them how to use their water."39 Hall's tenure as
State Engineer in the 1880s failed to convince
Californians that state regulation and fair use should
be the foundation of the state's use of water, although
he provided the historical foundation for the vision of
California as a neo-Mediterranean commonwealth. His
1881 plan "to overhaul and systematize water in
California involved too many forfeitures and sacrifices
for the established water interests in the state."40
Private development, by both individual landowners
and private cooperative irrigation organizations, was
too firmly established when the state first began to
consider promoting irrigation.
There have been some great builders, such as
William Warne, because the state has functioned primarily as a lender and carrier (like the World Bank) and
not as a regulator. The state has lent its capital and
political power to create the expectation that there will
be supply augmentation on demand. The state's
39. Gerald D. Bowden et al.. Institutions: Customs, Laws and
Organizations, in COMPETITION FOR CALIFORNIA WATER: ALTERNATIVE
RESOLUTIONS
163, 166 (Earnest A. Engelbert & Ann Foley Scheuring eds.,
1982).
40. STARR,
supra note 24, at 9.
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lender role was cast in the 1920s.41 Local irrigation districts and private power companies preempted the
rivers flowing out of the Sierra, the Kings, the San
Joaquin, the Merced, the Tuolumne, the Stanislaus, as
well as the Mokelume, the lower Feather and the Yuba,
The great treatise writer, Samuel Well, pronounced
against the proposal to administer water by an administrative agency, and voters defeated a plan to impose
state control through a Water and Power Board.
In other states, public ownership meant state control through thie office of the State Engineer who
screened new appropriations and transfers, as well as
enforced priorities among right holders. However, In
California, it came to mean state distribution for public and private entities. In 1914, the year that California
adopted a state-administered permit system, the
California Supreme Court held that riparian rights are
vested rights and announced the doctrine that the
waters of non-navigable streams are public or belong
to the state. Therefore private ownership "has no support in the statutes of this state or in any decision of
this court."42 This echoes the statement of a delegate
to the 1879 constitutional convention who declared
that water was property and "that a man has a right to
waste or destroy it, just the same as he has to kill his
own horse if he chooses."43 In this spirit, Samuel Well
explicitly rejected the Wyoming and Utah permit
approach and argued that post-1914 prior unregistered
appropriations should prevail over registered ones.44
Thus, common law and customary rights may still be
claimed in California, making it a lawyer's dream and
an administrator's nightmare to consider administering a major stream, like the Delta impasse. This Is also
amply illustrated in the related efforts currently being
4
used to restore the San loaquin River. '
C.The Real Dual System: Positive Uncertainty
To water lawyers, California's dual system means
the mixed system of riparian and appropriative rights
that prevailed in the humid and semi-arid bands on
either side of Inter-Mountain West. However, the real
dual system of California water law are the two systems developed by the courts and the legislature,
These systems were developed as the result of alternating bursts of judicial activism and restraint, but the
two systems are more separate than they are In other
western states. The judiciary initially played a leading
role in water allocation but that role has gradually
been conceded to the legislature, except in the case of
southern California groundwater.
42. Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 138 P 997,999 (Cal, 1914)
43. Quoted in Henry Scheiber. Race, Radicalism, and Reform Historical
Perspective on the 1879 CaliforniaConstitutionalConvention. 17 HAs1iNcs Co*ST,
L. 0. 35, 66 (1989).

44. Samuel C, Wtel, Unregistered Water Appropriations at Law and In
41. Joe S. Bain, Water Resource Development in California: The
Equity. 14 CAL. L. REV.427. 429 (1926).
Comparative Efficiency of Local. State, and Federal Agencies. in WATER
RESOURCES
45. SeeSue McClurg, San loaquin River, WESTERN
WATER,
lanJFeb
MANAGE
MENTANDPUBUCPOUCY14, 15-18 (Thomas A. Campbell & Robert
1994, at 4.
0. Sylvester eds.. 1968).
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1. Prior Appropriation for Miners
The courts' first task was to develop a water law
suitable for placer mining. The courts did this through
the adoption of prior appropriation, but some, like the
late Frank I. Trelease and my mentor and great friend
Charlie Meyers. would say that the courts failed to
carry the system to its logical conclusion. Water law
developed in California. and therefore the West. as
part of a larger effort to legitimate mining, which was
nothing but a trespass against the federal government.
In theory, all water law in the West should be a federal
law of riparian rights. The United States was the proprietary owner of the public domain and could assert
all common law incidents of ownership. including
riparian rights. As a California court said in 1986, "the
United States may assert the same proprietary interests. including a riparian water right, that a private
individual could assert. "4 6 But, the California courts
also pioneered the opposite approach. They allowed
water users to assert customary, non-common law
water rights to promote the efficient use of water.
In the foothills of the Sierra. gold miners were
using water for placer mining under informal rules of
priority during the transition of California from
Mexican to United States sovereignty. When the issue
of their right to take water from the streams first
reached the courts, there was great pressure, as John
"4 7
Leshey has observed, to "rationalize the status quo.
In 1855. the California Supreme Court decided a case
in which two miners on the public domain asserted
inconsistent water rights. One asserted a right to take
the water away from the stream via a canal and justified it because he was the first to put the water to use:
the second miner wanted to blast riparian lands and
asserted a riparian right.
Irwin v. Phillips held for the first user because mining custom rejected the common law of riparian
rights.48 However. the prior appropriation doctrine
protected what the common law had long protected.
security of possession. The maxim first in time, first in
right had long been applied to recognize rights to previously unowned resources such as game or between
trespassers even when the court recognized a better
owner. Irwin has been hailed on two related grounds.
Those who think that courts should adapt law to social
conditions approve the use of custom as a source of
rights. Proponents of market solutions hail the adoption of prior appropriation as a creative step because
the court created the necessary condition-exclusive
46. In re Hallet Creek Stream System. 232 Cal Rptr 208. 215 (3rd
Dist. 1986).
47. John Leshey. The Prior Approprition D itne cf \Vater Lawrin fe
West: An Emperor with FewCoLhes. I W. Nov 1990. at 5.7
48. Irwin v. Phillips. 5 Cal- 140 (I3)
49. Terry L Anderson & P'
.
Study of the American West. 1811
note 38-

"ution of Preprty Ri;his A
(.A (
64(19751
Ci Pisani, supra

50. Eric T Freyfogle. Lux v Haggin and the Common Lza,Burdens 4f

property rights-for a market to work. However, this
view has been challenged because the court simply
.acted conservatively and in conformity with the common law" by protecting a prior trespasser.50
2. Dual Rights for Irrigators
By the 1880s. courts had to decide which theory
controlled irrigation, but unlike many other western
states. California refused to reject the common law.
The Supreme Court's role in supporting irrigation is
still the subject of intense debate which is difficult to
resolve because the effects were variously positive.
perhaps negative and often neutral. Courts first recognized the developing grain and rice economy in the
Sacramento Valley by shutting down hydraulic mining
because debris-laden streams made it difficult if not
impossible to maintain levees." But unlike the ard
West. California did not have a subsistence irrigation
economy which demanded a firm system of property
rights which prior appropriation provided. The states
of the Rocky and Inter-Mountain \Vest rejected, after
initial hesitation, the doctrine of riparian rights.' 2
California took a different tack that has caused confusion ever since. In 1886. the California Supreme Court
decided the great case of Lux v. Haggin.53 Lux adopted
a dual system of riparian-appropriative rights. The
court refused to follow the Colorado doctrine, and
imposed on California the full force of the common
law of natural rights.
The case was a fight between Haggin, founder of
the Kern County Land Company. and the equally large
land holdings of Miller and Lux. Haggin, whose extensive canal system decreased the flow of the Kern. was
the champion of prior appropriation. The court rejected his argument that appropriation be adopted as the
sole law of the state by the imperative of aridity
because riparian rights were vested common law property rights. The court did, however, adopt the more
progressive, diversion-oriented reasonable use over
the natural flow doctrine. And, in the end, the two litigants combined forces to form the Kern County Land
Company,
Environmentalists criticize Lux because it reflected a laissez faire spirit that erected artificially narrow
conceptions of common law property rights to foil legislative follies, and as such, it was ill-suited to
California at that time."' In contrast. Kevin Starr credits the case with establishing the cooperative model
for the 20th century irrigation economy in the Valley. It
Is Important to observe that the politics of irrigation
485 535 (1936)
tJWrn Waze, Law. 57 U Cicto L REsV
51 RoMaT L KELLY.GO VS Gs.OIN THE Hyvp-,Auc MImiG
240 11959). and HATn.oG
CoGw.TZTS N C .LIM'i'SS&LM.-,rO VALLEY
THE L%,-; SE. A'.rssi Pourri Cutuuae. Rrauc Pcuicy. AiDoTHz
1850-1496. at 217 (1989)
Svcsj.rr,"o VALLEY
52 R :.s" Dt.i.p.FR.

RiGr (1983)
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53 Luxv Hagin. 69 Cal 255 (1886)
54 Frefele. surra note 50
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were very balanced and water use at the time did not
dictate either system. The state was in transition from
a non-irrigation grain economy to an irrigation economy. Irrigation was not widely adopted in California
until the last decade of the 19th century, although it
had been practiced for two decades previously on a
small scale. In southern California, an irrigation economy was developing around the utopian irrigation
colonies, seeking to develop a Virgilian fruit-and-vine
culture in eastern Los Angeles County, Riverside and
Orange Counties. These colonies allocated water by
customary sharing regimes that were neither appropriative nor riparian. Mutual water companies, which
evolved from the early irrigation colonies, thrived
using both forms of right. Further, reformers were critical of the monopoly and inefficiency potential of each
system. For example, William Hammond Hall, the
unpopular but visionary State Engineer, criticized both
systems for promoting monopolies.
In theory, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
administer the dual system because California recognizes common law unused riparian rights, riparian
rights put to a reasonable beneficial use, pre-1914
appropriative rights and post-1914 water licenses.55
The dual system has been much criticized, but in fact
the uncertainty is crucial to the state system of large
districts. Administration, however, is irrelevant
because there has been no need to quantify rights. The
real water right instruments in California are from the
Bureau of Reclamation and State Water Project contracts.
3. Real Rights for GroundwaterUse
The major exception to the tradition of maintained uncertain water rights is the adjudication of
many groundwater basins in southern California. The
adjustment to groundwater use is a fascinating story
with a mixed message. State and federal law have
allowed groundwater mining and contamination by
creating incentives to over-use aquifers both as
sources of water supply and as sinks. The California
Supreme Court created effectively exclusive property
rights that served to stabilize use in southern
California, but Central Valley farmers blocked the idea
of adjudication or a state administered system of
groundwater rights, and thus created a system of
administered district recapture of CVP return flows and
artificial recharge.5 6 Only now are the state and, to a
lesser extent, the federal government taking steps to
turn these historic incentives into disincentives, as all
major groundwater users have begun to realize that
55. Technically, prior appropriation applies only to water users on
public lands. See San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. W.H.
Worswlck. 187 Cal. 674 (1922) (a Desert Land Act patentee has riparian
rights which can be asserted against a downstream prior appropriator on
private lands) The best expositions of the California dual-system
remain WELLS A HUTCHINS,
THE CAUFORNIA
LAw OFWVATER
RIGHTSf1956);
WELLs A. HUTCHINS,
WATER
RIGHTS
LAws IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN
STATES
179-214 (completed by Harold H. Ellis & I Peter DeBraal. Misc.
Publication No. 1206, U.S. Dept of Agriculture, Vol 3 1977); and Note.
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they are worse off in the long run with a rule of capture.
The ground-breaking case of Katz v. Walkinshaw57
substituted a correlative rights rule for the common
law reasonable use rule, which placed no restraints on
overlying use. Katz was the California Supreme Court's
creative response to the fruit-and-vine culture by
transforming groundwater from an exclusive to a
shared resource. Katz marked the end of individualism
by broadly establishing the proposition that private
property rights must be subordinated to the rights of
similar users arid the interest of the state in conservation. In place of the common law rules, all overlying
owners in a basin were given correlative rights to the
safe yield of the aquifer; any surplus water above the
needs of the overlying owners short of safe yield Is
subject to appropriation by non-overlying users.
justice Shaw reasoned that the common law absolute
rule of ownership had no place in the dynamic economy of California:
We cannot perceive how a doctrine offering
so little protection to the investments in and
product of such enterprises, and offering
such a temptation to others to capture the
water on which they depend, can tend to promote developments in the future or preserve
those already made, and therefore, we do not
believe that public policy or regard for the
general welfare demands the doctrine.5 8
The problem with Katz is that the sharing rules are
unclear and thus they do not effectively restrain use.
Judicial rules are not self-executing. Other users must
have a sufficient incentive to commence an adjudication or a state agency must intervene to force the
assignment of exclusive property rights. Neither of
these conditions have been met outside of southern
California, because only in southern California, especially in Los Angeles, has there been a single institution with an interest in groundwater conservation. The
Metropolitan Water District had surplus Colorado
River surface water to sell and thus was able to use
adjudication to create a basin-wide management
scheme administered by special districts and supported by the ready availability of recharge water, In Los
Angeles, withdrawals were capped at the safe or sustainable yield and all major basins were adjudicated to
adjust individual pumping rights to this cap.
The California Supreme Court has used Katz to
adjudicate southern California's basins, but the Incentives to adjudicate have not been duplicated In the
Federal-StateConflicts Over the Controlof Western Waters, 60 COLu,
(1960).

L REv 697

56. See Barbara T. Andrews & Sally K Fatrfax, Groundwater and
Intergovernmental Relations in the Southern San loaquin Valley o California what
Are All These ooks Doing to the Broth?, 55 U CoLo L REv 145 11984)
57. Katz v. Walklnshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1903)
58. Id. at 133.
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San Joaquin Valley. Katz was designed to catch basins
before they went into a severe prolonged overdraft, but
in Pasadena v. Alhambra,59 Katz was adapted to basins
with a severe, sustained overdraft. By the 1940s. in several Los Angeles basins overdrafts were severe enough
to threaten continued growth, the life blood of the
region, and major adjudications were commenced. In
Pasadena. the Supreme Court created the doctrine of
mutual prescription, which in effect ratified a voluntary
agreement among the major pumpers to cut back to
safe yield. This doctrine was extended to curtail pumping in basins threatened with salt water intrusion
before the Supreme Court rejected them due to conflicts among municipalities and to protect the primacy
of Los Angeles' demands6 0
Adjudication in southern California occurred
because of the high value of the resource, the availability of alternative surface supplies and the existence
of water agencies to apply conjunctive management to
achieve safe yield. For example. Orange County has
adjusted withdrawals to be supplied by pump taxes
used to spread recharge water, making this strategy
the functional equivalent of an adjudication. Although
these factors were also present in the San Joaquin
Valley, they did not produce similar incentives and
constraints to limit pumping. Instead, management
took the form of conjunctive use of ground and surface
supplies without adjudication. Thus, the groundwater
use rule was Katz, which was in effect a rule of open
access. Opposition to adjudication became an article
of faith for users and suppliers in the southern San
6
loaquin. 1
The lack of groundwater rights makes users vulnerable to state reallocation as well as making it difficult to integrate quality and quantity considerations
regarding what the state is trying to do with surface
water.62 The potential to adapt groundwater rights to
quality control is illustrated by recent actions by the
Utah State Engineer. Utah is not a leader in either
water management or water pollution control, but
both ground and surface water rights are allocated by
prior appropriation and this provides the framework
for the integration of water quality and quantity considerations. Groundwater in the Salt Lake Valley is
59. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal 2d 908 (19491
60. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando. 14 Cal 3d 199
(1975).
note 2. at 201. There isa long hissupra
61. Gorru. &F ZSLWAONS.
tory of failed efforts to develop a state regulatory regime for Groundwater extraction. The debate, especially the gradual weakening of Valley
WATER
opposition, can be followed in the 20 Proc. BIENIA.CoNF GROUND
sponsored by the University of California Water Resources Center. the
California Department of Water Resources. and the State Water
Resources Control Board. The major effort occurred In the wake of the
mid-1970s drought when Governor Brown created a Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, For an Insightful
review of the efforts to develop a groundwater law. see Harrison C
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threatened by contamination from mining wastes. The
State Engineer is developing a plan to use the prior
appropriation system to curtail junior rights when
pumping threatens to accelerate the movement of
contaminant plumes into vulnerable areas of the
Valley. 63
4. The Dawn of the Construction Era:
Money and Public Power for Cities and Agriculture
At the same time that the courts had to confront
irrigation. they had to adjust to growing municipal
demands. The court first did this by awarding Los
Angeles a super-priority for the use of waters in the
Los Angeles River watershed and the Pueblo Rights by
limiting groundwater use in the face of an ambiguous
legal history.P As municipal use conflicts abated,
especially after the Owens Valley was tapped, powerirrigation conflicts took center stage. In his famous
1922 address. lustice Shaw incorrectly predicted. "Ido
not think that the law applicable to this process will
present much difficulty.-65
In the infamous Herninghaus decisione6 the
California Supreme Court adjusted water law to the
need to store water for municipal and industrial use
and for power generation by making it impossible to
secure a riparian storage right. Herainghausheld that
downstream riparians were entitled to the full natural
flood flow of a stream as against an upstream appropriator. It took a state constitutional amendment, now
Article X. Section 2 to impose the reasonable beneficial use rule on California. Moreover. the Court had to
create a new water law that further blurred the classic
lines between riparian and appropriative rights. In a
series of major cases in the 1930s and 40s, the
California Supreme Court began the aggressive promotion of efficiency over property rights to support
municipal use over inflated irrigation claims. A series
of decisions: (1) limited riparian rights to reasonable,
e.g. non-wasteful uses; (2) applied the balance of equities doctrine to injunctive relief, thus curtailing it; and
(3) adopted the physical solution. 67 The doctrine.
grounded in equity's power to fashion appropriate
remedies, is another reflection of the non-importance
of water rights. Water is allocated by blocks and the
U.irSH7sED Bus-t or WATR C'rimur Pactto:; (19913. for a series of
case studies that demonstrate that the existence of a scheme for allocating exdusive property rights In ground-ater makes it easier to incorporate water quality considerations Into water rights.
63 R M..organ. Regulation of Groundwater In Salt Lake Valley.
Paper presented at Inn-,atIon In Western Water Law. Un-,ersity of
Co!orado Natural Resources Law Center. Boulder. Colorado. fun. 5-7.
1991 (on file with author) Se: a'oGTcHzs ETA.. supra note 62
64 The Vernon Irrigation Co v City of Los Angeles. 106 Cal. 237,
on stare decisis. Sez City of Los
241 (18951 The doctlne nowt re
Angeles v City of San Fernando. 14 CaL 3d 199 (1975)
65 lOCt. L REv 460(1922)
66 Hermlnghaus v Southern California Edison Co. 200 CaL 81
mdawd.275 US 486 (19271
(1926).wt
67 Peabody v City of Vallelo. 2 Cal 2d 351 11935)
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Supreme Court has held in a series of cases beginning
with the Kaweah Delta case 68 that a junior with the water
could satisfy prior rights by supplying water and by lining the senior's canals. Other decisions extend the
doctrine by allowing a junior to satisfy the right with
replacement water. 69
Joslin v. Main Municipal Water District70 continued
the subordination of riparian rights by holding that
municipal water suppliers may construct dams without
the necessity of compensating lower riparians, except
those with direct flow diversions. The California
Supreme Court held that a gravel company, which
depended on the flow of a stream, had no compensable property interest against the District which built
an upstream water supply reservoir. The surprising
reason was that the use of the stream to mine gravel
was not reasonable.7' "Unlike the unanimous policy
pronouncements relative to the use and conservation
of natural waters, we are unaware of one relative to the
of sand, gravel and rock in comsupply and availability
72
mercial quantities."
Two other decisions carried forward this tradition,
but decreased the protection afforded to small. riparian uses. People v,Shirokow73 resolved a longstanding
debate among water law aficionados by holding that
post-1914 prescriptive water rights are invalid against
permits issued by the State Water Resources Control
74
Board. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System
used an adjudication of a small stream on the eastern
slope of the northern Sierra to create an unprecedented (and perhaps unconstitutional) two-tiered system
of common law riparian rights. The specific issue was
whether the Board should recognize and protect
unused riparian rights. Almost all other western states
that adopted the California dual system have dealt
with unused riparian rights by eliminating them. The
courts upheld the constitutionality of legislation which
converted all riparian rights that were put to beneficial
use at the time of the adoption of prior appropriation.
Long Valley solved the problem by recognizing unused
riparian rights but subordinating them to all appropriative rights and riparian rights put to beneficial use.
C. The Federal Role: Cash Only, Please
California's water institutions developed without
any substantial federal counterbalance until the environmental era. State supremacy is a legacy of the lag
68 Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist. 3
Cal 2d 489. 502 (1935).
69 Harrison Dunning, The PhysicalSolution in Western Water Law. 57
U COLO L'REv. 445 (1986),
70 Joslin v Matin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal 1967). For
an argument that loslin Is the cornerstone of California water policy
because It requires that all water rights be exercised consistently with
contemporary economic and social conditions, see Brian E. Gray, -in
Search of Bigfootl: The Common Lw Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, 17 HASTINGS
CoNsT. L.O 225 (1989)
71 Joslin provoked a stinging criticism from the late Dean Charles
I Meyers, Review. Clark Waters and Water Rights. A Treatise on the Law of

in the assertion of federal power over the settlement of
California and the West. Starting in California, customary institutions filled the vacuum left by the abrupt
end of Mexican rule and these became the basis of a
legal theory in which the federal government acquiesced to state resource allocation, Justice Stephen
Field ultimately laid the legal foundation for the power
vacuum by simultaneously grounding water and mineral rights on the only legitimate source of titlefederal ownership of the public domain-and effectively stripping'the federal government of the control
over waters arising out of the public domain, During
his tenure on the California Supreme Court and then
his 35-year tenure on the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Field transformed the miners' claims to
both hard rock minerals and water from crimes to vested property rights. For minerals, in the great Fremont
litigation, he rejected the Spanish theory of crown or
government ownership. Miners' customs were characterized as 'presumed licenses" which were transformed
7
into property rights by federal acquiescence. '
Most western states proceeded to apply Field's
theory that custom was the basis of water law and that
the federal government had left water allocation to the
states. In 1935, Justice Sutherland, the model for the
current Chief Justice, vindicated Field's theory that the
federal government was estopped to assert its full constitutional power over western waters. He held In
California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement C0.76
that Congress had severed water from federal lands
and confirmed state control. The constitutional issues
are more complex, but the important point is that the
expectation of state control became a political and
legal reality that continues to shape water allocation.
Governor Wilson's recent initiations to return the CVP
to state control carry forward this tradition.
California has been a leader in the western fight to
save the region from federal domination of its water. It
has fought the Bureau of Reclamation and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) over the 160acre limitation, the Colorado River and reservoir operation. The net result is mixed, but on balance the state
managed to chart its own water destiny. Federal water
policy in California has historically focused on the
enforcement of the acreage limitation contained In the
Reclamation Act of 1902.77 The generally successful

efforts of the state to thwart enforcement of the 160Waters and Allied Problems, 77 YALE
Ll 1036, 1049-50 (1968)
72. 429 P 2d at 894.

73 People v. Shlrokow, 605 P 2d 859, 865 (Cal 1980)
74. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal 3d 339
(1979),
75. A. DANTARLOCK
Er AL. WATER REsourcE MANAGF.MENT
158-59 (4th
ed. 1993)

76. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
77. See B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17
STAN.
L REv. 1 (1964), for a lively and highly critical Insider's view of the
state supremacy debate.
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acre limitation in the San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys
led to the idea of the federal government as intruder
when it strayed from being a regional venture capitalist. Although the federal government controls the allocation of the Colorado. and FERC decisions continue
to preempt state law. 78 the state thwarted the enforcement of the 160-acre limitation through administrative
waivers. Bureau inaction79 and legislative modification80 and has imposed a strong presumption that
state law controls the operation of Bureau projects.8'
For example, the Imperial Valley's political power
allowed it to obtain an exemption from the limitation
during the Hoover Administration 82 and the Imperial
Irrigation District (liD) has historically functioned as a
sovereign government. Visiting lID headquarters is like
a trip to one of the former Soviet Central Asian
republics. The Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers are a visible presence in the state
because of the Central Valley Project and the Colorado
River Storage Project, but they have not been powerful
enough to assert federal interests distinct from those
83
of large water users.
In the end, California's fight to control the Bureau
of Reclamation has put them in the position of the
French who constructed the Maginot Line to prevent a
German attack. The attack came from a different direction, as did the federal intrusion into state water policy. The federal agencies driving California water policy
are the federal Environmental Protection Agency.
which has threatened to set water quality standards for
the Delta after the state couldn't muster the political
78. California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n. 495 US 490
(1990).
79. The late Paul Taylor of the University of California. Berkeley
was the leading critic of the Bureau's lack of enforcement of the acreage
limitation. See PAUL TAYLOR.ESSAYSON LAND. WATERAND THE LAW L1
CAUFORiN
(1979).
80. The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Pub L No 97-293. 96
Stat. 1261 (codified at 43 U.S.C. f§ 373(a). 390aa-ZZ. 422e. 425b. 502
(1993)). repealed the residency requirement and raised the acreage limitation from 160 1320 for a husband and wife) to 960 acres with a 2.080
cap for leased acreage. Excess lands must pay the full cost of prolect
water. The constitutionality of the -hammerclause. 43 USC §39Occjb).

was upheld in Peterson v. United States Dep't of Interior. 899 F.2d 799
(9th Cir. 19901. cet. denied. I I S. CL. 567 (1990). and Barcellos and Wolfson
v. Westlands Water Dist.. 899 F.2d 814 (9th CIr.}. cert denitd. I IS Ct 555
(1990).
81. California v. United States. 438 U.S 645 (1978). United States
v. California. 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir 1982), Se grenelly BR.raA T_
ANDREWS & MARIESANSONE.WHO RUNSTHE RrvRS? DAMs ANDDEcarOw
s m
THE NEw VEst (1983).

82. Bryant v Yellen. 447 U.S. 352 (19801 (Interior Secretary Lyman
Wilbur impliedly waived 160-acre limitation for the Imperial Irrigation
District).
83. Basically. after the Bureau failed to carry out Its original mission to finance the settlement of the West in 320 acre units. It formed
coalitions with irrigators and dties In the West who needed subsidzed
water and power and subordinated the original federal Interest to the
interests of state water users. In the San Joaquin Valley. large farmers
who opposed the Bureau's role. Se SHERio DowirEY. THEYWouLo RULE
THE VALLEY
(1947). outmaneuvered the Bureau to give the Corps control
of the Kern and Kings Rivers to avoid the acreage limitation. se R. n F.
supra note 8. at 181-89. The farmers had their cakeend ate it too by das-
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will to limit diversions, and the Fish and Wildlife
Service of the Department of the interior, which has
listed the Delta smelt as a threatened species under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).P The designation
of streams as critical habitats for threatened and
endangered species under ESA has Created regulatory
water rights which trump any state-created water
rights85 and neither the Clean Water Acts nor the ESA
is the equivalent to Section 8 of the Redamation Act.
in contrast, these acts partially preempt state law by
casually redefinng beneficial use as the flow level of a
stream necessary to fulfill the purpose of the statute.
IV.The Post-Construction Era: Ad Hoc Reallocation
Squeezed by the successful efforts of environmentalists to reduce Los Angeles' Mono Lake tributary diversions and the Delta controversy. California is slouching toward a new water allocation policy based on
greater reliance on markets and a fuller appreciation of
the social values of water. The issue is. basically, how
much agricultural use must be reduced and reallocated. Federal and state environmental regulation, such
as the Endangered Species Act and Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act. will Increasingly drive state allocation
law. In the process, groundwater may be slowly transformed into a property rights regime to preserve the
commons.m California has also begun the slow transition away from its high-tech system of agriculture that
stressed crop strain and production innovation to a
sifying Frtant Dam. built as a flood control project. as a reclamation pro-

lect to avo!d the navigation servitudce United States v Gerlach Live
Stock Co. 339 US 725 (19501 in the end. the Bureau was able to operate in the Valley by nut enforcing the acreage limitation. See HutN-LE.
supra note 5. at 262-68
84 The National Marine Fisheries Service has also Issued a reasonable-and.prudent alternative to protect flows forwinter-run Chinook
salmon A concise summary of the current efforts to balance environmental protection and consumptve use In the delta and a htstory of the
shift from state to federal control of the Delta may be found In I
CALUICNZA WATER
PI' UOATE 207-21 (1993)
85 Sue United States v Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist. 788 F.Supp.
1126 (ED Cal l9921, Palla v Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural
Resources, 639 F2d 495 (9th Cir 1931. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon v Babbitt. I F3d I ID.C Cir. 19931.
86 Starting In the 193OS.California has taken several legislative
steps towards transformng its Groundwater resources of unlimited
access commons to a resource base for the states future development
With concern mounting over the side-effects of the quantity of pesticide
use. the state Is taking advantage of the opportunities In federal pestidde law to enact more stringent regulations. The best known initiative
Is Proposition 65. the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act of 1936, which prohibits the knowing discharge or
release of listed chemicals known to cause cancer Into drinking water
supplies For a discussion of other programs that take a more comprehensive and potentially far.reachlng approach to the problem of groundwater contamination, see A. Dan Tarlock. Tr Rc!? ofLa- in Managing
GrarIWalir O
Vj---'.
Hz II Fa:?.in Ct iocis PZ.CiTCEs. s pra note
61. at 39. and W Don Ma u ghan. 1.Manr4 c21rn7.c s waL rO =Izz
. int-e
1990s. in Ctw.*C- P.,=s surapm
note 61. at 29- In 1992. California created a process to allow local agencies to formulate and implement
groundwater management plans CAL WAne CooF § 10750 etw .
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policy that balances technology with the sustainability
of the resource base.87 The future will involve a combination of regulation, water markets and conservation.
A. Property Rights Shrink to Protect Fish
and Brine Shrimp, and to Promote Conservation
The major legacy of the 19th and early 20th century attempts to anchor development in secure private
water rights unregulated by a strong state agency, is
that it is difficult to discipline the exercise of them
without eliminating them. The California Supreme
Court has continued its tradition of "blockbuster" decisions, which fundamentally change the politics of
water allocation defining rights, either to invite or
implement legislative intervention. However, the difference between the modern decisions and the prior
tradition is that the state has not accepted the judicial
invitation to implement the reform. Thus, the courts
have created a high level of new uncertainty with little
legislative relief.
The California Supreme Court and courts of
appeal have at various times attempted to define
secure exclusive property rights, but the attempt has
not or will not succeed over the long run because the
courts' decisions, in my opinion, reflect the reality that
security is not a primary goal for physical, economic
and environmental reasons. The decisions basically
tell the block holders to use water more efficiently so
that new public values can be accommodated. A brief
summary of the most important California "reform"
water cases since 1967 illustrates the incomplete legal
process approach of the courts' recent water law
jurisprudence.
The Court's most successful and dramatic role has
been to level the playing field by elevating non-consumptive uses to equal dignity with consumptive
ones. In NationalAudubon Society v. SuperiorCourt of Alpine
County,8 the Court held that the public trust doctrine

requires that vested appropriative. as well as riparian,
rights must be exercised in a manner consistent with
trust values. These values include commercial navigation, recreation and ecosystem protection. The immediate effect of the decision is clear: Los Angeles has
had to reduce its diversions to prevent further lowering
of Mono Lake, but the long-term implications for state
water law are less clear. Public trust litigation is a sign
of failed state management rather than an affirmative
solution to the state's problems. However, as the court
limits existing consumptive use rights, this pushes
87. This transition is reflected in the 1986 amendments to the
State Agriculture Policy Act, CAL FOOD
ANDAGRIC.
CODE § 802, in includIng alternative agricultural techniques In the state agricultural research
agenda, CAL.FOODANDAGRIC. CODE §§550-55, 576-85, and In the more
aggressive regulation of pesticide use. Federal pesticide regulation has
lust begun to focus on the problem of groundwater regulation, but
California has directly addressed the problem of specific pesticides
which cause groundwater contamination. In 1985, the state enacted the
Pesticide Groundwater Contamination Act which empowers the State
Board of Food and Agriculture to list chemicals with the potential to pollute groundwater, to establish Pesticide Management Zones for areas

both agricultural and urban water suppliers into the
brave new world of demand management-conservation.
United States v. State Water Resources Control Board89
brought to a head the long history of the state's effort
to reconcile the consumptive use of the flows that feed
the San Francisco Bay Delta and the prevention of
saline intrusion into it. The Court held that California's
integrated water quality and quantity law requires that
the State Water Resources Control Board first set
water quality standards for the Delta and then adjust,
e.g., reduce water entitlements to meet the standards,
A related development is occurring in the San Joaquin
Valley as the Bureau of Reclamation is seeking to
impose higher prices and environmental conditions on
the renewal of project delivery contracts.
B. Divesting Vested Expectations
These combined efforts to trim water rights raise
the question of whether these post-Reclamation era
reallocations constitute a taking of property without
just compensation. Property serves to check the arbitrary exercise of state power, but the constitutional
question cannot be answered in the abstract, Water
rights must be evaluated in the context of the history
of subsidized water development followed by federal
environmental regulation. Current United States
Supreme Court takings law makes them more
amenable to legislative adjustment than dry land
rights. Water rights have been historically limited and
they have been supported by subsidies, not the
strongest reed upon which to construct a strong vested rights argument.
In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,90 the Court
announced a strict new test to review regulations that
deprive land of all beneficial uses. This test will seldom be applicable to water rights controversies
because a user will seldom be deprived of all water.
The fights are about limiting the amount of water that
can be diverted. Even a total deprivation may be justified. Lucas limited the state's ability to justify the regulation by characterizing the regulated use as harmful,
but the Court announced a new justification: "any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership." 91Justice Scalia intended this to
be a narrow, if not impossible, justification to estabthat are sensitive to groundwater pollution, and to ban or condition the
use of pesticides that are likely to leach Into the subsoil In 1989, the
Board suspended the use of the herbicide Benatzon for use In ten ricegrowing counties In northern California. THE CAuroREt REGULATORY
LAW
REPORTER,
Summer 1989, at 96.

88. 33 Cal. 3d 419, Cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983),
89. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986),
90. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
91. Id.at 2900.
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lish92 and it applies with special force to water. espedally in California. because water rights have always
been limited to promote sharing among potential
93
users.
Water rights, unlike land rights in the United
States, have alvays been subject to the requirement
that water be put to beneficial use. This anti-waste
prohibition is a common law 'background- standard
incorporated into property rights. The successful state
effort to shock the Imperial Irrigation District into
negotiating a conservation agreement with MWD illustrates the inherent limitations contained in the beneficial doctrine.
Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources
Control Board94 was the final stage of State Water
Resources Control Board action against the lID at the
.request" of a Salton Sea landowner flooded by liD's
return flows. 95 In an earlier action the Board ruled that
lID's pre-1914 water rights were subject to the state
constitutional prohibition against waste.9 Shocked.
lID persisted in the argument that it was a foreign
nation exempt from state control. Technically. it
argued that the District could not be required to prepare a conservation plan because that would constitute a taking of its vested rights. 97 In the course of
stripping wasteful uses from vested rights-a part of
the law in all other western states for well over 100
years-the court went directly to the heart of liD's
argument that it -has been deprived of a great deal of
the property rights.. .inherent in its allocation of the
Colorado River waters, made many years ago by federal and state statute and private contract. 98
The tenor.. .of [liD's complainti is that lID is
being unfairly treated. it has occupied a position of strength, discretion and vested right
in a geographical part of the country that is
"far western," embracing a philosophy that is
independent in every sense of the word.
Recent trends in water-use philosophy and
the administration of water law have severely
92. Explaining. criticizing, and interpreting justice Scalla's opinions is a major cottage industry See.e-g. Fred P. Bosselman. ScaL cn
Land. in LAND USE REGULAmO ,ND THETAtNG OF POFEort Wmiout
CompEsio,4 (David Callies ed., 1993) at 82. and Joseph L Sax. Pmp'enuy
Rights and the Economy of Nature- Understanding Lucas v South Carfrrta Ccosal
Council, 45 STAN. L REv 1433 (19931
93. Professor Frank Michelman argues that Justice Scalla's opinion
is inconsistent with the Courts federalism jurisprudence which defers to
state characterizations of property rights, and thus state law Is much
more important in the recognition of property daims that he antidpated. Frank L Michelman. Property. Federalism and JurtsprudructA Ccrmtnt cn
Lucas and JudicialConservatism. 35 VWm.
& WRY L. REv 301 (19931 The significance for California water rights regulation Is highly resistant to constitutional challenge. A recent survey of the meaning of California water
and fish and wildlife law for takings law concludes. 'Thus. at a minimum.
where private uses of property would Interfere with or damage public
property rights... public trust rights, or state waters Including ground
water and navigable waters, denial of that use should not constitute a
compensable taking.- James Jordan Patterson. Californta L r Use
Regulation Post Lucas: The History and Erolution c[ Nuisance and Puf!c Prtny

Laws Portend ittle Impact in Calornia. I I UCLA I ENcvnL
L &Poi'v 175. 185
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undermined the positions of districts such as
lID.99

The Ninth Circuit and lower federal courts have
recently begun to apply this -reality' to exclude subsidized water from the cirde of vested rights. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the -hammer clause" of the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. which terminated the
acreage limitation exemption for subsidized water
deliveries to leased lands, because "Itlo find a vested
contract right.. .would seriously impair Congress' sovereign power to pass laws for the public welfare.- M In
the litigation for the Westlands Water District contract
(subsidy) renewals, the Ninth Circuit has held that a
subsidized water rate-3.50 and SI .50 per acre-footis not a constitutionally protected property right
because it is an interest based -only on economic and
political predictions, not property rights."' 0' especially
because the original beneficiaries -have probably sold
out and retired by now," 02
C. Bringing Alienability to Water Rights
The final new development that will reshape
California water policy Is the emergence of water markets in California. Water markets have emerged as a
result of the continued increase in the value of municipal and Industrial water compared to agricultural use
and the prolonged drought. Both the environmental
community, such as the Environmental Defense Fund,
water economists and now many suppliers, such as the
Metropolitan Water District. have endorsed water marketing as the way to shrink irrigated agriculture to benefit cities and the environment. 03 This is a rational
strategy but it flies in the face of the Mediterranean
garden vision of California. and thus is fraught with
political danger. It requires districts which maintain
their power through the control of large blocks of water
to partially self-destruct.
For this reason, marketing arrangements are still
informal and are viewed primarily as ad hoc adjustments to temporary droughts until the major reser(19931
94 225 Cal App 3d 5M 11990). eer,
nd',

112S Ct. 171 11991)_

95 1I at 552
96 Id
97 0. at571
98 Id

99 Id
100 Peterson v United States Dep't of Interior. 899 F2d 799. 8t I

(9th Cir 1990). ert dw'Nd. It 2S Ct- 567 (1990)
101 M.adera Irrigation Dist v Hancock. 985 F2d 1397. 1400 (9th
COr19931
102 Id at 1403
103 The argument was first comprehensively de'.eloped in Z.cH
%Vmme.
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voirs return to full capacity. Many transfers are temporary, and thus there has been no need to resolve many
of the complex legal issues that transfers of both
appropriative and riparian rights raise.' °4 For example,
California created a water bank in 1991 which successfully bridged the gap between areas of surplus, primarily in the Delta and lower Sacramento, and urban
demand in the San Francisco Bay Area and Los
Angeles. In its first year, the Bank acquired 820,100
acre-feet of water at $125.00 per acre-foot which it sold
at $175.00 per acre-foot. By 1992, however, conservation measures and groundwater seepage reduced the
Bank's balance to 155,000 acre-feet which it sold at
$72.00 per acre-foot. 05 The Imperial Irrigation DistrictMetropolitan Water District water transfer is widely
hailed as a model, but it too is an ad hoc extra-legal
transaction rather than a true market transfer. After
years of negotiation, lID recognized that its power was
eroding and agreed to give 100,000 acre-feet of its
Colorado River water entitlement to Los Angeles in
return for the cash to use its substantial remaining
supplies more efficiently. In the grand California tradition of manufactured supply, MWD paid lID some $220
million to conserve 100,000 acre-feet of water not
being put to beneficial use' 06 and to which MWD had a
strong claim under the "Law of the River.- With straight
faces, the parties agreed that the agreement does not
affect any future water right claim that either party
07
might make.'

Nevadas, or even further back. This Is an unrealistic
vision that illustrates the fundamental problem with
all visions that question the need to supply unlimited
state growth. There is no background standard against
which sustainability can be measured. If the state Is to
move a sustainable water use policy, It must embrace
the idea of adaptive environmental management and
conservation.
Law cannot provide the necessary vision or sclence to chart a new water future but It can make a
modest contri6ution by creating incentives for all
water users to confront the reality of reallocation and
the state's inherent supply limitations. A better definition of water rights is needed to disabuse holders of
the notion that there is always a supply augmentation
fix on the horizon and to force them to devise ways to
live with limits. In the end, all water Interests In
California will gain from the better definition of water
rights. In particular, major agricultural users will gain
because water rights will become firmer, and thus
more intelligent, and rational decisions about the
future use or transfer of water can be made.

V. The Uncertain Future
At the end of his long and distinguished career, the
late Wallace Stegner observed that California could
support a population equal to Japan's, but he did not
want to be alive to witness the test of the state's carryIng capacity 08 Stegner's dilemma reflects the tension
between reality and vision which is at the heart of
efforts to formulate a new water policy. California
water planning is premised on a continuation of the
past. The 1993 State Water Plan Update projects a population of close to 50 million by 2020109 but alternative
visions of sustainability are being advanced to challenge the legacy of the 20th century."10 The-extreme
anti-development vision is a return to California as it
was when John C. Fremont first crossed the Sierra
104. BRIN GRAY,
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17 (1994).
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PREPARED
FORTHECAIFORNIA
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(1992).
106, 225 Cal. App, 3d 548.
107. Water Conservation Agreement Between the MWD of
Southern California and lID. Part G (1989). SeeWATER
TRANSFERS
IN THE
WEST, supra note 12. Under the Seven Party Agreement, which defines the
relative priorities of California users to the state's share of the Colorado

River. unused water passes down the priority scale, lID holds the second
and third priorities and MWD fourth and fifth.
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(rev. ed. 1990).
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